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Abstract--A Heterogeneous Distributed Sensor Network 
(HDSN) is a type of distributed sensor network where sensors 
with different functional types participate at the same time. In 
this network model, the sensors are associated with different 
deployment groups but they cooperate with each other within 
and out of their respective groups. The heterogeneity of HDSN 
refers to the functional heterogeneity of the sensors participating 
in the network unlike the heterogeneity considered (e.g., 
considering transmission range, energy level, computation 
ability, sensing range) for traditional heterogeneous sensor 
networks. Taking this model into account, we propose a secure 
group association authentication mechanism using one-way 
accumulator which ensures that; before collaborating for a 
particular task, any pair of nodes in the same deployment group 
can verify the legitimacy of group association of each other. 
Secure addition and deletion of sensors are also supported in this 
approach. In addition, a policy-based sensor addition procedure 
is also suggested. For secure handling of disconnected node of a 
group, we use an efficient pairwise key derivation scheme. Side 
by side proposing our mechanisms, we also discuss the 
characteristics of HDSN, its scopes, applicability, challenges, and 
future. The efficiency of our management approach is 
demonstrated with performance evaluation and analysis. 
 
Index Terms—Accumulator, Association, Heterogeneous, 
Security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is composed of 
hundreds or thousands of inexpensive, low-powered 
sensing devices with limited computational and 
communication resources. Typical task of the sensors is to 
sense certain parameters from their surrounding environments 
and to send the readings to a central entity called base station. 
The raw data collected from such a network are analyzed to 
extract important information about a particular area and are 
often used for taking important decisions. Considering today’s 
advancements and achievements, the applicability of sensor 
network is very broad. With the capabilities of today’s 
sensors, many applications can be benefited a lot. Now we 
have varieties of sensors that can monitor temperature, 
pressure, humidity, soil makeup, vehicular movement, noise 
level, lighting condition, the presence or absence of certain 
kinds of objects, mechanical stress level on attached objects, 
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and other properties. These tiny devices could be used for 
surveillance in military and public-oriented applications, target 
tracking, environmental monitoring, patient monitoring in 
hospitals, disaster management and warning systems, and in 
so many other applications. 
With the rapid advancements of wireless technologies and 
sophistication of sensing technologies, many innovative 
applications could be thought of using the smart sensors. 
Though most of the applications focus on collecting a specific 
type of data, for some applications it is necessary to acquire 
different types of data from the same geographical region. 
Again, some applications might need collaborative operations 
among the sensors before producing reports to send to the base 
station/sink. As an example, a volcano monitoring application 
may require thermal, seismic, and acoustic data from the same 
geographic location. Though only one type of data may be 
satisfactory for such an application, using various types of 
data could be more beneficial for extracting accurate and 
timely information. Say for example, the average temperature 
(already processed by a sub-set of nodes) of a certain region 
along with the seismic and acoustic readings can provide more 
precise information regarding an imminent event. Especially 
for disaster management and warning systems, military 
applications, and medical applications, use of multiple types 
of data can really be advantageous. To facilitate such types of 
applications that need more than one type of data, ExScal 
mote [1], [2] is designed by CrossBow Inc. and Ohio State 
University. This mote is basically an extension of the well-
known MICA2 mote [3] which supports multiple sensors (i.e., 
sensing units) on the same radio board. However, instead of 
using this type of multipurpose node in the network, using 
different types of nodes in the same area could be more 
efficient considering the utilization of memory, processing, 
and energy resources of the sensors. We will provide more 
points in the next section to support this argument. The key 
point here is that whatever the configurations of the sensors 
are, heterogeneous data are often required for some 
applications which can increase the complexity of tasks in the 
network. Hence, efficient methods are required for dealing 
with all aspects in such types of applications. 
Security is one of the critical aspects in any kind of sensor 
network. It is anticipated that in most application domains, 
sensor networks constitute an information source that is a 
mission critical system component and thus, require 
commensurate security protection. If an adversary can thwart 
the work of the network by perturbing the generated 
information, stopping production, or pilfering information, 
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then the usefulness of sensor networks is drastically curtailed. 
So, it should be made sure that the sensors that are 
participating in the data acquisition and supplying process are 
authentic and are included as legitimate entities in the 
network. To be specific, along with other supporting security 
mechanisms, it is required to verify the authenticity of the 
sensors before allowing them to participate in any 
collaborative task. 
Considering all these factors, in the remainder of this article 
we first propose our model in Section II. We present our 
network assumptions and preliminaries in Section III and IV. 
Then, we propose our approach of secure group association 
management in Heterogeneous Distributed Sensor Networks 
in Section V. Performance analysis and discussions are 
presented in Section VI and finally, Section VII concludes the 
article with future scopes of research on this network model. 
II.  BACKGROUND: HETEROGENEOUS DISTRIBUTED SENSOR 
NETWORK 
A.  What is Heterogeneous Distributed Sensor Network? 
Typical ‘heterogeneity’ in sensor network is considered 
based on the capabilities of the sensors in the network or more 
specifically based on the memory, processing capability, 
energy level, sensing range, and transmission range of the 
radio [5], [6]. Say for example, transmission range of a sensor 
depends on the level of energy. Larger transmission range 
requires more energy or vice versa. So, in most of the cases, 
the heterogeneity is defined considering the dissimilarities in 
the energy level, processing power, and transmission range. 
However, in our case this term refers to the dissimilarities in 
the functions of the sensors. Say for example; in a given 
network, type 1 sensors sense temperature, type 2 sensors 
sense seismic signals, type 3 sensors sense magnetism, and so 
on. In our model, different types of sensors (with different 
sensing units) may even have similar capabilities (in terms of 
other capabilities), but this fact doesn’t help to give the 
network a ‘homogeneous’ tag. 
We term our model network as Heterogeneous Distributed 
Sensor Network (HDSN), where sensors of various functional 
capabilities form different functional groups [9]. There could 
be T (where, 1 ൏ ܶ ൑ 6) functional types of sensors in the 
deployed network. We primarily consider at most six types of 
nodes in the same HDSN as this could be enough for 
supporting any of today’s applications and many innovative 
multi-purpose applications of sensor networks in the coming 
future. The value of T could also be set based on the 
application at hand. The network is called homogeneous when 
T = 1, that means there is only one type of sensor in the whole 
network. For deploying the entire network, first a number of 
different types of sensors are taken and they are assigned 
different ids based on their functional types. 
Figure 1 shows a graphical model of a Heterogeneous 
Distributed Sensor Network (HDSN). In this figure, T=3. Like 
any other Distributed Sensor Network (DSN), it has a large 
number of sensors covering a large area. The deployment is 
dense so that a particular network region is covered perfectly. 
Also we assume that the sensors could frequently be added or 
deleted from the network. In the figure, we show three 
different sinks collecting data from three different deployment 
groups (DGs). A deployment group (DG) is composed of only 
one type of sensor and it spreads over the entire area of the 
network. The sinks shown in the model are inter-connected 
securely with each other. There could also be only one sink 
gathering all forms of data from different DGs. In such a case, 
the processing burden of the sink increases as it has to collect, 
classify, and process different types of incoming data 
simultaneously. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  An example of Heterogeneous Distributed Sensor Network (HDSN) 
deployment. Here, T=3. Three types of sensors are dispersed over the same 
target area. Same types of sensors form a deployment group (e.g., all the gray 
sensors (Type 2) form one network-wide deployment group (DG)) 
Each of the DGs covers the whole AOI (Area of Interest) 
and works independently. However, the data packets from a 
sensor in one DG could be relayed by the sensors of another 
DG. So, practically in this sample HDSN, there are three 
distributed sensor networks of different functionalities that are 
working individually but side-by-side cooperating with each 
other for data transmissions and network operations. However, 
for collaborating for a particular task, the neighboring sensors 
must be the members of the same deployment group. That 
means even if two dissimilar sensors are neighbors to each 
other, they can only help for forwarding each other’s packets 
but cannot take part in the same collaborative task. Figure 2 
illustrates this. In the figure, three nodes 1, 2, and 3 are 
neighbors of each other but each of them is from a different 
network-wide DG. They can just relay each other’s packets if 
needed, but cannot participate in the same task. 
B.  Why HDSN? 
Now, an important point of argument can be that; instead of 
using multiple nodes over the same area, similar benefit could 
be achieved by using multipurpose nodes (like ExScal motes) 
in the network. Sometimes (not always) it might even be more 
cost effective solution than our approach. However, 
considering all pros and cons, we have found that the use of 
large number of homogeneous multipurpose nodes (for 
collecting heterogeneous data) is less efficient than our 
approach considering some network settings. It cannot be said 
whether use of HDSN is always advantageous or not. Instead, 
the verdict depends on the network settings and given 
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application requirements. Some sample cases where HDSN 
could be a preferable choice over other options are: 
(i) In HDSN, a particular DG could be kept in sleep mode 
whenever necessary while other DGs can keep functioning 
(Say for example, in Figure 1, Type 1 sensors are kept in sleep 
mode for a certain period of time). As the deployment of 
sensors is dense, the connectivity of the whole network is 
supposed to be supportable even if a particular DG is in sleep 
mode. This feature can help for maximizing the lifetime of the 
overall network as in such case at least one DG could be 
preserved for a long time even if the energies of other types of 
nodes are exhausted. On the other hand, ExScal type nodes 
need continuous wake mode when any of the sensing units on 
the same radio board is functioning. This eventually causes 
continuous consumption of energy resource (i.e., battery). 
Putting this type of multipurpose node in sleep mode means 
all of the sensing units would become idle at the same time.  
(ii) For assigning different security levels for different 
types of sensed data, HDSN is a good platform. Different 
security levels could be set for different DGs based on the 
requirements and/or functions of the sensors. 
 
Fig. 2.  Nodes in different DGs are neighbors to each other but are not able to 
take part in the same task. For a given collaborative task, two neighbors must 
be of the same functional type.  The distinguishable connecting lines show the 
achievable associations between any pair of nodes of same type 
(iii) HDSN offers a great advantage over multipurpose 
node-based network in case of physical capture attack. If a 
physical intruder intends to hamper the sensing of different 
parameters in a particular location, it needs to destroy all types 
of sensors in that location. For example, in our shown model 
the attacker needs to destroy at least three sensors from a 
particular section of the network. On the other hand, for a 
network consisted of multipurpose nodes, destroying one node 
is enough to destroy three sensing units assigned for a 
particular spot. The latter is a relatively easier task for a 
physical intruder. 
(iv) In HDSN, different sinks associated with different DGs 
can gather and analyze specific type of data separately. They 
can even collaborate with each other after extracting the gist 
from the collected data. This facility is not available if ExScal 
type motes are used with a single base station. In many cases, 
multiple types of readings from multipurpose nodes can 
somewhat increase the complexity of tasks for the sink as it 
has to classify and reorder incoming data prior to using them. 
Use of multiple base stations in the same scenario cannot even 
help as various types of data packets are amalgamated in the 
incoming traffic for each base station. 
III.  NETWORK ASSUMPTIONS 
We assume that in each DG, for each participating node 
there is an end-to-end path from the corresponding sink to the 
node. That means in a particular deployment group, iG , i=1, 
2, 3….T, (where T is the maximum number of DGs in the 
HDSN), for each node 
iG
n , there is a path from the 
corresponding sink, 
iiii GmmG
nnnS L→−→→ )1( . A 
scheme like that is presented in [7] could be used for energy-
efficient logical structuring of the network to get a sink rooted 
tree (SRT) for each deployment group (DG). In this case, 
iG
n  
is the leaf node and there could be zero or more intermediate 
nodes along the end-to-end path. 
We assume that each sink associated with each DG has 
enough processing power to do the initial calculations to 
initiate the network-wide groups in the network. The sensors 
deployed in the network have the computational, memory, 
communication, and power resources like the current 
generation of sensor nodes (e.g., MICA2 motes [3]). Once the 
sensors are deployed over the target area, they remain 
relatively static in their respective positions; that means the 
neighboring nodes move together (if mobility is allowed) or 
do not move at all. 
Based on these network assumptions, our goal here is to 
propose a mechanism by which the nodes in a particular DG 
might securely recognize one another so that any adverse 
entity cannot in any way be included in the network within its 
operation time. This kind of group association verification 
could especially be required for performing some 
collaborative tasks in the network. For example, when the sink 
wants to know the average temperature of a certain region, the 
temperature sensors in that region might have to work together 
to measure the average of the temperature readings over that 
particular area. There could also be some sort of data 
aggregator or pre-processor which would be responsible for 
doing the primary calculations. In fact, our secure group 
association verification mechanism could well be used with 
other clustering mechanisms where there are some cluster 
heads present to collect these types of readings from a certain 
set of sensors. 
IV.  BUILDING BLOCKS OF OUR SECURITY MANAGEMENT 
SCHEME 
In this section we introduce one-way accumulator and 
pseudoinverse matrix which are used as the building blocks 
for our security management scheme.  
A.  One Way Accumulator 
From the definition of a one-way function we know that it 
is a function F with the property that; for a given x  it is easy 
to compute )(xFy = . However, given yF , , it is 
computationally infeasible to determine x  such as 
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)(1 yFx −= . Generally, one-way functions take a single 
argument. However, Benaloh and Mare [4] considered hash 
functions which take two arguments from comparably sized 
domains and produce a result of similar size. In other words, 
according to [4], a hash function is a function F with the 
property that, CBAF →×: where, CBA ≈≈ . This 
view introduces the one-way hash function with a special 
quasi-commutative property which is termed as one-way 
accumulator (OWA). According to the definition, OWA is a 
one-way function, XYXf →×: with the quasi-
commutative property such that, for all, Xx ∈ and for all, 
Yyy ∈21, ,  
)),,(()),,(( 1221 yyxffyyxff =  
A family of one-way accumulators is a family of one-way 
hash functions each of which is quasi-commutative. 
This property is not unusual. In fact, addition and 
multiplication modulo n both have this property as does 
exponentiation modulo n when written as, 
nxyxe yn  mod),( = . Modular exponentiation also satisfies 
the quasi-commutative property of one-way accumulator: 
nxyyxffyyxff yy  mod)),,(()),,(( 211221 ==  
This could be extended for a long sequence of jy  values 
(where, mj ,,1L= ). 
The quasi-commutative property of one-way accumulators f 
ensures that if one starts with an initial value, Xx ∈ , and a 
set of values Yyyy m ∈,,, 21 L , then the accumulated hash, 
)),),,),),),,(((((( 12321 mmm yyyyyyxffffffz −−= LL  
would be unchanged if the order of the jy s were permuted. 
This feature could be used for membership verification in a 
large set of entities. We adopt this feature of OWA for secure 
group association authentication in HDSN. 
B.  Pseudoinverse Matrix 
The pseudoinverse matrix or generalised inverse matrix 
[10], [11] has a very nice property that could be used for 
cryptographic operations. It is well known that a nonsingular 
matrix over any field has a unique inverse. For a general 
matrix of dimension nk × , there might exist more than one 
generalized inverse. This is denoted by, =),( nkM {A: A is a 
nk ×  matrix}. Let ),( nkMA∈ . If there exists a matrix 
),( knMB ∈  such that, AABA =  and BBAB = then 
each of A and B is called a generalized inverse matrix (or 
pseudoinverse matrix) of the other. In this article, we use the 
notation
gA  to denote the generalized inverse matrix of A. We 
use pseudoinverse matrix for the pairwise key derivation 
process presented later in the article. 
It should be noted that AA gg =)( is not always true. The set 
of all possible pseudoinverse matrices of A is denoted by 
}{ gA  and |}{| gA is the cardinality of }{ gA . Then we have: 
Lemma 1: Let gA be a pseudoinverse matrix of A . Then, 
                                                           
)()( ArankArank g =  
Lemma 2: Let ),( nkMA∈ with kArank =)( . If A
can be written as ]0;[ 1AA = , where 1A is a kk ×
nonsingular matrix then, ),(:{}{
1
1 kknMZ
Z
A
Ag −∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
−
 is 
an arbitrary matrix} 
Proof: Let ),( knM
Z
X
B ∈⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡= . It is then easy to verify 
that both AABA = and BBAB = hold if and only if 
1
1
−= AX . 
V.  SECURE GROUP ASSOCIATION MANAGEMENT IN HDSN 
A.  Association of Sensors in the DGs 
The simplest way to maintain the group association 
information of a particular group of sensors could be storing 
the member ids (the ids of each participating sensor in that 
group) in each sensor node. However, the storage requirement 
for such member id list linearly increases with the increase of 
the number of sensors in that particular group. For the sensors 
with limited storage capabilities, this is not a good solution. 
Hence, we employ an efficient OWA-based scheme for 
managing the membership information of a group in such a 
way that it could well be supported by the storage and 
computation power of the modern-era sensors. Also based on 
this limited information, the sensors in a particular DG can 
securely verify and recognize each other. 
B.   Calculating Partial Accumulated Hash Value (PHV) 
In case of one-way accumulator, if the values, 
myyy ,,, 21 L  are associated with the users of any 
cryptosystem, the accumulated hash z  of all of the jy s can 
be computed. A user holding a particular jy  can compute a 
partial accumulated hash jz of all iy with ji ≠ . The holder 
jy  can then demonstrate that jy  was a part of the original 
hash by presenting jz  and jy  such that, ),( jj yzfz = . 
We use this partial accumulated hash values in the 
membership verification process. The following sub-sections 
present our scheme in details. 
C.  Pre-Processing and Pre-storing of PHVs 
Before deployment of a group of sensors, the following 
steps are performed: 
1. A unique id, jy , mj ,,1L=  is assigned for each 
sensor participating in a particular deployment group. 
2. Two safe relatively prime numbers, p and 12 += pq  
are generated. 
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3. n and )(nφ  are computed as, pqn = and Euler’s 
totient function, )1)(1()( −−= qpnφ . 
4. A random number x (as a seed) is generated which is 
same for every node in the group. 
5. PHV for each node jy  is computed using the formula, 
nxz
m
jii i
y
j  mod,1
∏= ≠=  
6. Now the values of jz , n , )(nφ , and corresponding jy  
are stored in each sensor in the deployment group. 
D.  Secure Group Association Verification 
After deployment of the sensors in the target area, if a node 
needs to verify the association of another node (whether they 
are in the same DG or not), the PHVs and the identities of the 
nodes are used. For example, let us suppose that two nodes 
pn and qn want to verify whether they are in the same group 
or not. For this membership verification, these two nodes 
exchange their pre-stored partial accumulated hash values pz , 
qz and their identities, py , qy . Node, qn  calculates 
nzyzfz ppp  mod ),( p
y== , while the other node 
calculates, nzyzfz qyqqq  mod ),( ==  locally. If both of 
the locally computed one-way accumulator values match with 
each other, the nodes could be sure that, they are participating 
as the siblings in the same DG in the HDSN. Once the 
accumulator value is calculated and matched, it could be 
preserved in the node for successive node membership 
verification for a given collaborative task. 
E.  Secure Pairwise Key Derivation between Two Sensors 
from Two different DGs 
Since for each DG, there is a sink rooted tree (as mentioned 
in the network assumption in section III), once a node in a 
particular DG finds and verifies its siblings, it can use them 
for forwarding its own readings. The problem arises when a 
node is disconnected from all other nodes of its same DG. It 
can happen due to the failure of an intermediate node of the 
same DG, or because of random (or, poor) deployment of the 
sensors. In such a case, though the stranded node cannot 
participate in the collaborative tasks, it needs to send its own 
readings to the sink/base station. In fact, it can even happen 
for a subset of nodes associated with a particular DG. To 
handle this issue, our mechanism uses a simple method of 
deriving pairwise keys between two neighboring sensors even 
if they are associated with two different DGs. Here we 
describe the secure pairwise key derivation method. 
Let 
XG
n be a node in deployment group, ܩ௑ and YGn  be a 
node in deployment group, ܩ௒ . XGn  has been somehow 
disconnected from its siblings but it has got 
YG
n as its 
neighbor, which is connected with the SRT of its own DG 
(i.e., ܩ௒).  To derive a shared secret key between these two 
nodes, following operations are performed: 
1. Node 
XG
n randomly generates a matrix X with 
dimension nm × and its psedoinverse matrix, gX . These 
matrices are kept secret in the node. 
2. 
XG
n calculates XX g and sends it to YGn . 
3. In turn, 
YG
n  randomly generates another matrix Y with 
dimension kn× , and finds out its pseudoinverse matrix gY . 
These matrices are also kept secret in node 
YG
n . 
4. 
YG
n calculates XYX g  and gg XYYX . Then it sends 
the resultant matrices to 
XG
n . 
5. Upon receiving the products of matrices from 
YG
n , 
XG
n  
computes, ggg XYYXYYXX = and sends it back to YGn . 
6. Now, both the nodes 
XG
n and 
YG
n can compute the 
common secret key. 
XG
n gets it by calculating 
XYXYXX g =)(  and YGn gets it by calculating 
XYYXYYg =)( . Both of these outcomes (XY) are the same 
matrix with dimension km× . 
 
Fig. 3. Pairwise key derivation process between two nodes. 
Figure 3 shows the communications between the two 
neighboring sensors in the pairwise key derivation process. 
Basically, the key XY  is locally computed by each node and 
the entire method is executed without the intervention of any 
third party. The derived pairwise key now could be used for 
secure communications between two nodes. In our case, the 
node 
XG
n  encrypts all its readings using the key and sends it 
to 
YG
n  which can use its own DG (i.e., ܩ௒) to forward it to the 
base station. Thus, in this process, even if the participating 
nodes are from different DGs, they can cooperate with each 
other for secure data handover within the network. 
F.  Addition of New Member in a Deployment Group 
Addition of new sensors in a particular DG could be 
handled in two ways. At the time of deploying the sensors, all 
the sensors assigned for a group might not be used, rather 
some of them could be kept for later use (depends on the 
nature of application at hand). Say for example, total number 
of sensors in a group before deployment is λ. So, a certain 
portion, say η of these sensors could be deployed first for that 
particular group and the remaining, )( ηλ − sensors could be 
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could in fact hamper proper functioning of other schemes 
running in parallel. While for different length ids, membership 
list technique requires huge amount of memory; in OWA-
based approach, considering the lengths of other parameters 
even 1280 bits (which is good enough for the security) and id 
length 1024 bits, the memory requirement is fairly less. A 
great advantage of our approach is that the increase of the 
number of nodes in the DG doesn't affect the storage 
requirements for a sensor. Hence, a large number of nodes can 
be supported for a heterogeneous distributed sensor network. 
For larger lengths of n  and other parameters, the storage 
requirement increases. However, still it is fairly affordable by 
today’s sensors and comparatively much less than that of 
storing the whole membership list. In a nutshell, our approach 
is fairly scalable. 
 
Fig. 5.  Storage requirement for a single node in membership list storing 
mechanism (for different lengths of IDs) and our scheme (considering id 1024 
bits and each of other values 1280 bits in length) 
 
B.  Computation Costs 
Another advantage of our scheme is that, as the entire pre-
processing step is done by the base station, the sensors do not 
need to bother about the calculations and no sensor resource is 
used for initializing the deployable groups (DGs). The sensors 
need to use the processing resource only for verification, 
sensor addition, or sensor deletion process. We found that, in 
the verification step for calculating the accumulator value, a 
node takes only about 3 milliseconds when 1024 bit id is used. 
This processing time is fair enough for such a scheme. 
Depending upon the size of the id, the processing time varies a 
little. 
C.  Security Analysis 
Now, let us talk about the security level of such scheme. 
One-way accumulator uses one-way hash function which 
means that; given Xx ∈ and Yy ∈ , for a given Yy ∈′ , it 
is difficult to find an Xx ∈′  such that, 
),(),( yxfyxf ′′= . So, an adversary that wants to forge a 
particular y′ would face with the difficulty of constructing an 
x′ with the property that, ),( yxfz ′′= . Likewise, in our 
scheme, the use of arbitrary values for PHV and identity of 
node cannot pass the membership verification mechanism and 
the adversary cannot in any way be included in the group. A 
potential threat is that, if a dishonest member in the group tries 
to construct a false pair ),( yx ′′  such that, ),( yxfz ′′=  by 
combining various node identities ( jy s) in one way or 
another. However, as mentioned earlier, this is not practical as 
the adverse node faces the difficulty of finding such a pair. 
Other methods of generating the pair might be possible. 
However, this could be handled by restricting the choice of the 
identities (set of jy s) of nodes, which is dependent on the 
decision of the central entity and based on the requirements. 
In the pre-processing stage, we use a rigid value of n. 
According to Benaloh and Mare [4], the advantage of using a 
rigid integer, pqn =  is that the group of squares (quadratic 
residues) modulo n that are relatively prime to n has the 
property that it has size, 
2
)1(
2
)1( −⋅−=′ qpn  and the function, 
nxyxe yn  mod),( =  is a permutation of this group 
whenever y and n′ are relatively prime. Thus, if the 
factorization of n is hidden, “random” exponentiations of an 
element of this group are extremely unlikely to produce 
elements of any proper subgroup. This means that repeated 
applications of ),( yxen  are extremely unlikely to reduce the 
size of the domain or produce random collisions. Although 
constructing rigid integers is somewhat harder than 
constructing ordinary, ‘difficult to factor’ integers, it is still 
quite feasible. 
D.  Further Discussion 
In this article, we have basically focused on ensuring secure 
membership of the nodes in the deployed groups in HDSN. 
Other security mechanisms can run side-by-side our scheme. 
In our approach, several groups of sensors could operate in the 
same heterogeneous distributed sensor network at the same 
time without hampering the operation of the nodes of other 
group. If required, there could be some other mechanisms of 
communications between the sinks of different groups or the 
nodes of different groups. This actually depends on the type of 
service required from the HDSN or the application at hand. At 
the time of deployment, if policy-based deployment is used, a 
certain portion of the sensors could be kept for future 
deployment. Yet, it would not affect anything in the deployed 
sensor group and all the other sensors in the DG can still 
verify each other’s legitimacy of membership. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE SCOPES OF RESEARCH 
In this article, first we have proposed a new deployment 
model of distributed sensor network termed HDSN. Based on 
the novel model, we then proposed a secure group association 
management scheme. Our scheme could be employed 
alongside other supplementary security mechanisms for 
HDSN. Our analysis shows that this scheme requires 
considerably very small storage and processing power, and is 
efficient enough to ensure secure membership of nodes in the 
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deployment groups in HDSN. We believe that our work opens 
the door for research on other interesting issues in HDSN. For 
example, handling heterogeneous traffic, prioritized data, 
maintaining heterogeneous levels of security, quality of 
service of heterogeneous data, lifetime maximization of 
deployment groups, etc. could be some of the challenging 
research issues for HDSN. As our future work, we will 
analyze our scheme considering various deployment scenarios 
and will perform a detailed practical experimentation on the 
efficiency of our approach. 
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